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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have demonstrated that reinforcement learning (RL)
agents are susceptible to adversarial manipulation, similar to vul-
nerabilities previously demonstrated in the supervised setting. Ac-
cordingly focus has remained with computer vision, and full observ-
ability. This paper focuses on reinforcement learning in the context
of autonomous defence in Software-Defined Networking (SDN). We
demonstrate that causative attacks—attacks that target the training
process—can poison RL agents even if the attacker only has partial
observability of the environment. In addition, we propose an inver-
sion defence method that aims to apply the opposite perturbation to
that which an attacker might use to generate their adversarial sam-
ples. Our experimental results illustrate that the countermeasure
can effectively reduce the impact of the causative attack, while not
significantly affecting the training process in non-attack scenarios.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Adversarial learning; • Secu-
rity and privacy→ Software and application security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Adversarial Machine Learning [8, 12, 24, 50] literature has
demonstrated that machine learning models are vulnerable to both
exploratory (test-time) and causative (training-time) attacks. These
attacks are typically crafted by applying calculated perturbations
to the test or training instances, in order to either cause misclassi-
fication or poison the training process. More recent studies [9, 19,
25, 44] have shown that similar attacks can also be effective against
reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms.
Unlike previous work that mainly focuses on the vision domain,
Han et al. [19] analyse how reinforcement learning agents react to
different forms of poisoning attacks in the context of autonomous
defence in Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [1]. In their exper-
iments they train an RL agent to inform the decisions of an SDN
controller seeking to prevent an attacker from propagating through
a network. They investigate the effect of an attacker poisoning the
RL training process. Section 2 provides a more detailed description.
The work of Han et al. [19] has a number of limitations: (1) full
observability of the (network) states is assumed in the analysis,
which is often not the case in real-world situations, especially for
the attacker; (2) while an important topic, treatment of RL defence
mechanisms is preliminary; and (3) the experiments are performed
on a relatively small network.
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In this work, we address these limitations and make the follow-
ing contributions: first imposing partial observability for the
attacker. Since it is unlikely that the attacker can map out the entire
network topology, we consider the scenario where the defender
has full observability of the network, but the attacker only knows
part of the topology. Fig. 1 depicts the example network studied in
this paper.
Second, we consider a much larger network with 100 nodes and
172 links. As shown in Fig. 1, the attacker has an initial foothold of
a handful of compromised nodes, and aims to propagate through
the network to take control of a specific node corresponding to
the critical server, which in response can be migrated by the de-
fender to some pre-determined alternate nodes. Under this setup,
the defender trains a reinforcement learning agent to (1) protect the
critical server from being compromised, and (2) maintain the net-
work functionality as much as possible, i.e., maximise the number
of nodes that can reach the critical server. On the other hand, the
attacker only has partial observability, which restricts their action
set: they cannot compromise an adjacent node unless the link to
the node is known.
Third, we propose a new inversion defence method to coun-
teract the causative attack on reinforcement learning algorithms.
Our experimental results suggest that the approach introduced
in [19] does not work well in our setup (Fig. 1). Instead, we design
a method that does not require any prior knowledge about the
attacker, and attempts to undo how attackers poison the training
process of the RL agents. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the
new defensive algorithm, and show that it has limited impact in
non-attack scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2
summarises the problem of applying reinforcement learning for
autonomous defence in computer networks; Section 3 introduces
the causative attack via state perturbation and Section 4 the de-
fence mechanism; Section 5 presents the experimental verification;
Section 6 reviews previous work in adversarial machine learning;
and finally Section 7 concludes the paper and offers directions for
future work.
2 PROBLEM: REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
FOR AUTONOMOUS NETWORK DEFENCE
We now overview the problem of autonomous defence in computer
networks using reinforcement learning.
2.1 Background on Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning [49] deals with a sequential decision mak-
ing problem where an agent interacts with the environment to
maximise its rewards. At each time step t , the agent (1) receives
an observation st of the environment; (2) takes an action at based
on its policy π , which is a mapping from states to actions; and (3)
obtains a reward rt based on state st , action at , and the environ-
ment’s transition to a new state st+1. The goal of the agent is to
maximise its cumulative rewards, i.e., Rt =
∑∞
τ=t γ
τ−t rτ , where
γ ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor which affects the present importance
of long-term rewards.
We focus our experiments on two widely used RL algorithms—
Double Deep Q-Networks (DDQN) [52] and Asynchronous Advan-
tage Actor-Critic (A3C) [34]—and transfer of attacks between them.
2.1.1 Double Deep Q-Networks (DDQN). Under a given policy π ,
the value of taking action a in state s is defined as: Qπ (s,a) =
E[Rt |st = s,at = a,π ]. The Q-learning algorithm [49] estimates
the optimal action value function Q∗(s,a) = maxπ Qπ (s,a), by ap-
plying the Bellman equationQ∗(s,a) = Es ′[rt +γ maxa′ Q∗(s ′,a′)].
In practice, Q-learning is commonly implemented by function ap-
proximation with parameters θ : Q∗(s,a) ≈ Q(s,a;θ ).
Classic Q-learning networks have a number of drawbacks: (1) the
i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) requirement of the
training data is violated as consecutive observations are correlated;
(2) the target function is unstable when Temporal Difference (TD)
errors are calculated; and (3) the rewards can be of different scales.
In order to solve these issues, Deep Q networks (DQN) [35] (1)
introduces experience replay, (2) uses a target network that fixes
its parameters (θ−) and only updates at regular intervals, and (3)
clips the rewards to the range of [−1, 1].
A remaining issue with DQN is value overestimation. To further
solve this problem, Hasselt et al. [52] generalise the Double Q-
learning algorithm [20] and propose Double DQN (DDQN). DDQN
separates action selection and action evaluation, i.e., one DQN is
used to determine the maximising action and a second one is used
to estimate its value.
2.1.2 Asynchronous Advantage Actor-Critic (A3C). Different from
the above algorithms that estimate the Q-value, actor-critic algo-
rithms estimate both the value function, i.e., either the Q-value or
the state-value (V-value): V π (s) = E[Rt |st = s,π ], and the policy
π (a |s ;θp ). Mnih et al. [34] propose an asynchronous variant of this
approach, called asynchronous advantage actor-critic (A3C). A3C
uses multiple threads to explore different parts of the state space
simultaneously, and updates the global network in an asynchro-
nous way. In addition, it uses the advantage function instead of
discounted returns to determine whether an action is good, so that
it can better focus on where the predictions are lacking.
2.2 Autonomous Network Defence with
Reinforcement Learning
In a computer network of |N | nodes, N = {n1,n2, ...,n |N |}, and
|L| links, L = {l1, l2, ..., l |L |} (e.g., Fig. 1): ND ⊂ N is the set of
critical servers to be protected (one or more blue nodes), NM ⊂ N
is the set of possible migration destinations for n ∈ ND (one or
more green nodes), and NA ⊂ N is the set of nodes that have been
compromised (red nodes). In addition, while the defender knows
all the nodes and links, the attacker is only able to map out a subset
of them, i.e., NO ⊂ N ,LO ⊂ L.
The attack scenario we consider is a cyber attack against the
network infrastructure. Here, the attack spreads through the net-
work, and aims to take control of the critical servers (note that here
we assume that the attacker has to compromise all nodes on the
path). However, they can compromise a node n only if there is a
link l ∈ LO between n and a compromised node n′ ∈ NA. That is
NA keeps expanding as the attack proceeds.
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Figure 1: Software-defined network setup.
In order to protect the critical servers from being compromised,
the defender trains an RL agent that:
(1) Monitors the system state. The system state is represented
using a binary feature representation. The state representa-
tion has a number of bits equal to the sum of the number
of nodes and number of links in the network. A bit corre-
sponding to a node is 0/1 to represent whether that node
is un/compromised1. A bit corresponding to a link is 0/1 to
represent whether that link is down/up.
(2) Makes a decision on the appropriate action to take when
in a given system state. The actions that are available com-
prise: (i) isolating and patching one node; (ii) reconnecting
one node and its links; (iii) migrating the critical server and
selecting the destination; and (iv) taking no action. Note
that for actions (i) or (ii), only one node can be isolated or
reconnected each action cycle time;
The reward function that the RL agent is trained on is based
on (i) whether any critical server has been compromised; (ii) the
number of nodes reachable from the critical servers; (iii) the number
of compromised nodes. In addition, another two factors are also
taken into consideration: (i) the migration cost and (ii) the validity
of an action, e.g., if a node has already been isolated, it cannot be
isolated again. Table 1 summarises the problem setting.
Under the described RL setup, we train multiple DDQN (with
Prioritised Experience Replay [46]) and A3C agents with different
structures, i.e., different numbers of hidden layers & different num-
bers of neurons per layer. These agents help us identify the optimal
policy for our example network without tampering: isolating nodes
in the order of 90, 53, 62, 22, 31 as shown in Fig. 2. This policy
results in a total of 82 out of 100 nodes being preserved.
However, the above cyber attack scenario and resulting trained
RL agents leave important questions unanswered: If the attacker
1Since detection is not our focus, we have modeled the defender as having in place
a detection system. Our experiments suggest that as long as the system achieves a
reasonable detection rate, e.g., ≥ 75%, it does not have an obvious impact on the
results for both attack and defence. In our experiment, the detection rate is set to 90%
has the ability to poison the training process, can the agents
still identify the optimal actions? What can the defender do
to mitigate attack impact? We seek to address these questions.
3 PARTIALLY-OBSERVABLE ATTACKS ON RL
BY STATE MANIPULATION
In order for RL techniques to be successfully applied in autonomous
cyber defence, it is crucial to analyse susceptibility of RL agents
to potential causative attacks. However, most existing attacks in
adversarial machine learning are gradient-descent based, and in
our case the attacker aims to manipulate the binary state of a node.
Therefore, gradient-descent based attacks are not applicable. In-
stead, we have investigated the following attack mechanisms: (1)
tampering with a small number (e.g., 5%) of rewards to maximise
the defender’s loss. Specifically, gradient information is used to
select which rewards to tamper with; (2) random perturbation of
the observed states; (3) manipulating the states to minimise the
defender’s rewards; and (4) manipulating the states to minimise
the probability of taking the optimal action. In our preliminary
experiments (see Appendix A for more details) we found that (4)
was the most effective and hence we subsequently use it as the
attacker’s strategy.
We focus on the scenario where the attacker tampers with the
states observed by the RL agents, so that the trained model learns
sub-optimal actions. Specifically, suppose that the agent observes an
experience (s,a, s ′, r )without any attacks, where s is the current sys-
tem state, a is the action taken by the agent, s ′ is the new state, and
r is the reward. When the system reaches the new state s ′, the agent
would continue to take the next optimal action a′. The attacker can
counteract this by introducing false positive (FP) and false negative
(FN) readings in s ′, meaning that uncompromised (compromised)
nodes will be reported as compromised (uncompromised) to the
defender. Consequently, the agent observes (s,a, s ′+δ , r ′) (where δ
represents the FP and FN readings) instead of (s,a, s ′, r ), and hence
may not take action a′ next.
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Table 1: Problem description: Reinforcement learning for autonomous network defence
Defender Attacker
State (1) Whether each node is compromised;
(2) Whether each link is turned on/off.
Actions (1) Isolate and patch a node;
(2) Reconnect a node and its links;
(3) Migrate the critical server and select the destination;
(4) Take no action
Compromise a node n only if there is a link l ∈ LO between
n and a compromised node n′ ∈ NA
Goals (1) Preserve the critical servers;
(2) Keep as many nodes uncompromised and reachable from
the critical servers as possible.
Compromise the critical servers.
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Figure 2: Optimal results in response to a cyber attack against the network (in the absence of attacking the RL algorithm).
The key issue here is how the attacker chooses the nodes to
manipulate. We consider the following strategy:
(1) Against the DDQN agent: loop through all observable nodes
to find δ that minimises theQ-value of the optimal action a′
for state s ′ + δ , i.e., argminδ Q(s ′ + δ ,a′);
(2) Against the A3C agent: loop through all observable nodes to
find δ that minimises the probability of taking the optimal
action a′ for state s ′ + δ , i.e., argminδ π (a′ |s ′ + δ ).
We next abstract the threat model for adversarial learning in
autonomous cyber defence as follows:
Black-box approach. The attacker does not have access to the de-
fender’s training model as per our partial observability assumption.
In other words, this constitutes a form of black-box attack, which
means the attacker needs to train their own surrogate model first,
based on the partial topology visible to them.
Limited choice of potential false positive and false negative nodes.
It is unlikely that the attacker can falsify the state of all observable
nodes. Therefore, we limit the nodes whose states can be perturbed
by the attacker. Section 5 further explains how these nodes are
selected.
Limits on the number of false readings per time step. In our exper-
iments, the number of false positive and false negative nodes that
can be introduced per time step are no more than two in each case.
Our view is that this model of attacker information/control is a
key point of interest in exploring domains beyond computer vision.
Algorithm 1 details this attack against DDQN. The algorithm for
attacks against A3C is similar and so is omitted.
4 THE INVERSION DEFENCE MECHANISM
For the defender we propose a countermeasure that generates train-
ing instances by applying a perturbation counter to simulated ad-
versarial samples.
We aim to design a defence mechanism that (1) effectively miti-
gates the impact of the above causative attack, (2) requiresminimum
knowledge of the attacker, and (3) does not affect the training when
there is no attack.
Since the attacker adds false readings δ into the observed states,
can δ be reversed? If the defender knows the nodes that are visible
to the attacker, limits on the FP & FN nodes, and the number of
such nodes, then they may find these false readings, by solving
the inverse problem of how the attacker generates the adversarial
samples: while the attacker receives (s,a, s ′, r ), and loops through
all observable nodes to find δ that either minimises the Q-value or
Adversarial Reinforcement Learning under Partial Observability in Software-Defined Networking , ,
Algorithm 1: Causative attack via state perturbation
Input :The original experience, (s,a, s ′, r ); The list of
observable nodes, NO ; The list of nodes that can be
perturbed as false positive (false negative) by the
attacker, LFP (LFN ); The main DQN, Q ; Limit on the
number of FPs and FNs per time, LIMIT
Output :The tampered experience (s,a, s ′ + δ , r ′)
1 FN = FP = {};
2 minQFN =minQFP = {};
3 a′ = argmaxa∗ Q(s ′,a∗);
4 for node n in NO do
5 if n is compromised and n in LFN then
6 mark n as uncompromised;
7 if Q(s ′ + δ ,a′) < any value inminQFN then
// δ represents the FP and/or FN readings
8 insert n and Q(s ′ + δ ,a′) into appropriate
positions in FN andminQFN ;
9 if |FN| > LIMIT then
10 remove extra nodes from FN andminQFN ;
11 restore n as compromised;
12 else if n is uncompromised and n in LFP then
13 mark n as compromised;
14 if Q(s ′ + δ ,a′) < any value inminQFP then
15 insert n and Q(s ′ + δ ,a′) into appropriate
positions in FP andminQFP ;
16 if |FP| > LIMIT then
17 remove extra nodes from FP andminQFP ;
18 restore n as uncompromised;
19 Change nodes in FN to uncompromised;
20 Change nodes in FP to compromised;
21 return (s,a, s ′ + δ , r ′)
the probability of action a′ for state s ′ + δ , the defender receives
(s,a, s ′+δ , r ′), and through the same nodes may find δ ′maximising
argmaxδ ′ Q(s ′+δ+δ ′,a′) for DDQN, and argmaxδ ′ π (a′ |s ′+δ+δ ′)
for A3C. In other words, δ ′ = −δ .
However, the attacker’s partial knowledge of the network topol-
ogy, the limits on the choice of FP & FN nodes, and the number of
false readings per time interval/step are not made known to the
defender. Therefore, as shown in Algorithm 2, we propose that
instead of looping through the nodes observable to the attacker,
the defender necessarily goes through all network nodes to find δ ′.
In addition, we also test using a different number of false readings
in our experiments (Section 5). δ ′ obtained in such a way may not
exactly match δ , and the defender can choose to either keep both
(s,a, s ′ + δ , r ′) and (s,a, s ′ + δ + δ ′, r ′), or just (s,a, s ′ + δ + δ ′, r ′).
This method does not make any assumptions about the attacker,
except that they falsify the states of certain nodes. However, as
demonstrated by the experimental results in Section 5, the method
is effective against the causative attack, and it does not prevent the
agent from learning the optimal actions in the non-attack scenario.
Algorithm 2: The inversion defence mechanism
Input :The potentially tampered experience, (s,a, s ′ + δ , r ′);
The main DQN, Q ; The list if all nodes, N ; The
estimate of the attacker’s limit on the number of FPs
and FNs per time, LIMIT ′
Output :The corrected experience (s,a, s ′ + δ + δ ′, r ′)
1 FN = FP = {}; // FN (FP) is a list of potentially false negative
(false positive) nodes tampered by the adversaries that need
to be corrected
2 maxQFN =maxQFP = {};
3 a′ = argmaxa∗ Q(s ′ + δ ,a∗);
4 for node n in N do
5 if n is compromised then
6 mark n as uncompromised;
7 if Q(s ′ + δ + δ ′,a′) > any value inmaxQFP then
// δ ′ represents the correction introduced by the
defender
// n is potentially a false positive node
8 insert n and Q(s ′ + δ + δ ′,a′) into appropriate
positions in FP andmaxQFP ;
9 if |FP | > LIMIT ′ then
10 remove extra nodes from FP andmaxQFP ;
11 restore n as compromised;
12 else if n is uncompromised then
13 mark n as compromised;
14 if Q(s ′ + δ + δ ′,a′) > any value inmaxQFN then
// n is potentially a false negativnode
15 insert n and Q(s ′ + δ + δ ′,a′) into appropriate
positions in FN andmaxQFN ;
16 if |FN | > LIMIT ′ then
17 remove extra nodes from FN andmaxQFN ;
18 restore n as uncompromised;
19 Change nodes in FN to compromised;
20 Change nodes in FP to uncompromised;
21 return (s,a, s ′ + δ + δ ′, r ′)
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We next introduce our experimental setup, present how DDQN
and A3C agents are affected by causative attacks, and demonstrate
effectiveness of the proposed defence.
5.1 SDN Experimental Environment
In order to better cope with today’s dynamic and high-bandwidth
traffic, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [1] is designed as a
next-generation tool chain for computer network management.
SDN adopts a three layer architecture: (1) in the top application
layer, applications that deliver services communicate their net-
work requirements to the controller via the northbound APIs; (2)
in the middle layer, the SDN controller translates the received re-
quirements into low-level controls, and passes them to the bottom
infrastructure layer via southbound APIs; (3) the infrastructure
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layer includes switches that control forwarding and data process-
ing. Under such an architecture, the controller has a centralised
view of the whole network, and is directly programmable since
network control is decoupled from forwarding functions. It is thus
convenient to monitor and reconfigure network resources.
There have been a number of proprietary and open-source SDN
controller software platforms, such as Cisco’s Open SDN Con-
troller [3], Floodlight [4], NOX/POX [6] and Open vSwitch [2].
In this paper, we choose OpenDaylight [32], the most popular open-
source SDN controller available.
Specifically, we use Mininet [5], a popular network emulator,
to create the network with 100 nodes and 172 links as shown in
Fig. 1. Once the network is created, OpenDaylight is added as the
controller. It provides APIs for the RL agent to retrieve network
information and execute different types of operations as defined in
Section 2.
We want to emphasise that SDN is only one platform we choose
for demonstration purposes—although it is used in production. The
studied causative attacks and the proposed defence method are not
coupled to any particular platform, such as the SDN platform.
5.2 Causative Attacks via State Perturbation
As described earlier in Section 3, the attacker needs to: (1) train its
own model—we achieve this by training a DDQN agent using the
partial topology visible to the attacker. The model is used as the
surrogate to attack both of the defender’s models (i.e. both DDQN
and A3C agents); (2) limit the nodes that they can perturb (this is an
appropriate threat model—even if the attacker can map out part of
the network topology, it is very unlikely that they can manipulate
the states of all those nodes). We run the attack by adding one FP
and one FN per time interval/step but without any limits on the
choices of FPs and FNs. In this way, we are able to find the nodes
that are most frequently selected as FPs and FNs. LFP and LFN in
Algorithm 1 are then initialised with these nodes. Note that the
nodes in LFP and LFN are different for the DDQN and A3C agents.
The attacker is only allowed to manipulate the states of these nodes;
(3) limit the number of false readings added per time interval—two
settings are used in our experiments: (i) one FP & one FN, and (ii)
two FPs & two FNs.
Fig. 3 shows the effectiveness of the attack under different set-
tings, where the top four, six, eight FP nodes and top two FN nodes
are selected, i.e., |LFP | = 4, 6 or 8, while |LFN | = 2. Additional
experiments with multiple combinations suggested that further
increasing |LFN | does not have an obvious impact on the results.
The results demonstrate that (1) the causative attack designed in
Algorithm 1 is effective against both agents when there is no form
of defence—a significant percentage of attacks either cause the crit-
ical server to be compromised (the red bars), or cause fewer nodes
to be preserved (the blue bars). Note that this also demonstrates the
existence of transferability between RL algorithms [39]—attackers
do not need to have knowledge of the defender’s model and hence
attempting to keep the model secret is not an effective counter-
measure against adversarial machine learning attacks; (2) given the
same number of false readings per time step, the stricter the limits
on the choices of FPs and FNs, i.e., the smaller |LFP | and |LFN | are,
the less powerful the attacks are—not only do the limits restrict
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(b) Attacks against A3C
Figure 3: Attacks against the DDQN & A3C agents. The
bars indicates the percentage of attacks (left y−axis) that
(1) have no impact; (2) cause fewer nodes to be preserved;
and (3) cause the critical server to be compromised. The line
marked by “◦” indicates the average number of preserved
servers (right y−axis).
which nodes can be manipulated, they decrease the number of steps
that are poisoned in each training episode; (3) interestingly, if we
compare the second and fourth bars in both Figs. 3a & 3b, when
|LFP | = 6, adding one FP & one FN per time step is more effective
than adding two FPs & two FNs per time step. This is because more
training steps are likely to be poisoned in the former case given
that |LFP | is the same.
In the next section, we test our proposed countermeasure against
the most powerful form of attack as illustrated in Fig. 3, where
|LFP | = 8, |LFN | = 2, and two FPs & two FNs are added per time
step.
5.2.1 Discussion on the Impact of Partial Observability. It is likely
that the effectiveness of the attack is impacted by the partial ob-
servability. As we have mentioned earlier in this section, a subset
of nodes are more frequently selected as FPs and FNs. In other
words, these nodes cause larger damage to the training process of
RL agents. Therefore, the attack will become more effective if the
attacker can take control over more of these most damaging nodes.
In our future work, we intend to further study the relation between
partial observability and attack effectiveness. Specifically, we will
identify the minimum set of nodes that the attacker need to control
in order to achieve a given level of efficiency.
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Figure 4: Defence against attacks on theDDQN&A3Cagents.
The first three bars correspond to the scenarios where
compared with the attacker, the defender adds less/the
same/more FPs and FNs per time step; while the last bar cor-
responds to the case where the defender falsely assumes the
presense of an attack.
5.3 Countermeasure
Our inversion defence method only assumes that attackers perturb
the states of a certain number of nodes in each training step, and
aims to identify & revert the manipulations. However, the defender
has to loop through all the nodes rather than the nodes in LFP &
LFN , and has to estimate the number of false readings added per
step.
Specifically, four scenarios are investigated: In the first three
scenarios, the attacker adds two FPs & two FNs per training step,
and |LFP | = 8, |LFN | = 2 (i.e., the most powerful form of attack
studied in the experiments), while the defender assumes that there
are (1) one FP & one FN, (2) two FPs & two FNs, (3) three FPs &
three FNs per training step. In the last case, the defender assumes
that two FPs & two FNs are added per time step, but in fact there is
no attack.
The first three scenarios investigate the situations where the
defender either does or does not know the limit on the number of
false readings added per time, while the last scenario is designed to
study whether the normal learning process will be impacted when
the defender falsely assumes the presence of an attack.
Comparing the rightmost bars in Figs. 3a & 3b and the left three
bars in Figs. 4a & 4b, we can see that the proposed defence method
can effectively mitigate the impact of the causative attacks—the
percentage of experiments where the critical server is compromised
drops from almost 100% to less than 30% on average. In addition,
the two rightmost bars in Fig. 4 also indicate that in most cases
the defence method will not prevent the agent from learning the
optimal actions when there is no attack—in all the cases represented
by the blue bar in Fig. 4a, only one less node is preserved.
5.3.1 Discussion on the Overhead. A disadvantage of the inversion
defence method is that it significantly slows down the training
process, as it is time-consuming to loop through all the nodes to
find the potential FPs and FNs. We aim to improve the performance
in our future work. Specifically, we find that not all nodes are
equally important in terms of preventing the critical server from
being compromised—incorrect readings from certain nodes can
cause more damage. Therefore, we will be investigating improving
the efficiency of the defence method by only looping through those
crucial nodes.
6 RELATEDWORK
This section first summarises adversarial machine learning against
supervised classifiers, and then reviews recent work on similar
attacks against reinforcement learning models. Finally, we discuss
existing defence mechanisms.
6.1 Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial machine learning aims to minimise the modifications to
the input, i.e., either the test instance or the training sample, to cause
a malfunction of the machine learning model. Biggio et al. [11, 12]
formulate the problem of evading a machine learning classifier as
optimisation of the model’s continuous scores, and use gradient
descent to generate adversarial samples.
Szegedy et al. [50] highlight the observation that modifications
imperceptible to humans can cause deep neural networks (DNNs) to
misclassify, and they design the Fast Gradient Sign Method [18] for
the attack. Since then a number of different methods for creating
adversarial samples have been proposed [14, 30, 36–38, 41, 43],
among which the C&W attack [14] is empirically the most efficient
exploratory attack so far.
Specifically, Papernot et al. [39, 40] have demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness of the black-box attack model, where the adversary
does not possess full knowledge of the target model, and has to
first approximate the model by observing the target’s performance.
They have investigated intra- and cross-technique transferability
between deep neural networks (DNNs), logistic regression, support
vector machines (SVMs), decision trees and the k-nearest neighbour
algorithm. In this paper, our results show that transferability also
exists between reinforcement learning algorithms.
6.2 Adversarial Reinforcement Learning
More recent work has shown that reinforcement learning models
are also vulnerable to the above attacks against classifiers. For
example, Huang et al. [25] demonstrate that both white-box and
black-box attacks using the Fast Gradient Sign Method [18] are
effective against deep RL.
Behzadan & Munir [9] were the first to investigate causative
attacks against RL agents. They show how adversaries can perturb
the observed state, in order to prevent the DQN agent from learning
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the correct policy. Specifically, the perturbation is generated using
both the Fast Gradient SignMethod and the Jacobian-based Saliency
Map Attack [41].
Lin et al. [28] propose two types of attacks against deep RL: (1)
strategically-timed attack, which aims to decrease the number of
time steps to launch the attack (i.e., manipulate the state). It esti-
mates when an adversarial sample will be effective, and uses the
C&W attack [14] to perturb the corresponding states; (2) enchant-
ing attack, which aims at misleading the agent to a specific state.
It uses a sampling-based cross-entropy method to find a sequence
of actions that will guide the agent to the target state, and progres-
sively craft the states so that the agent will always take the next
required action.
Pattanaik et al. [44] show that even the naïve attack, that is,
adding random noise into the current state, is effective against deep
RL—this is contrary to our experimental findings. However, our
scenario is different to that described by the authors, including the
dimensions of the state, the action space, and they design a gradient
based attack that aims to maximise the probability of taking the
worst possible action.
6.3 Existing Defence Mechanisms
Generally speaking, existing defence methods against adversarial
machine learning can be categorised into two classes: (1) data-
driven defence, which either filters adversarial samples [17, 26,
27, 33, 48], injects adversarial samples into training—a.k.a., adver-
sarial training [18, 50, 51], or projects inputs into a lower dimen-
sion [10, 15, 53, 54]; (2) learner robustification, which stabilises the
training [23, 42, 55], applies moving target [47], or leverages ideas
from robust statistics [16, 45].
However, recent studies [13, 22] point out that most of the
above methods only consider either relatively weak attacks, e.g.,
FGSM [18], or attackers that are not aware of the defence mecha-
nism. Negative results are reported on the effectiveness of these
methods against adaptive attackers that are aware of the defence
and act accordingly, and against the C&W attack [14] or the PGD
attack [30]. In addition, Athalye et al. [7] show that defences relying
on obfuscated gradients can also be circumvented.
Countermeasures against attacks on RL models adopt similar
approaches. For example, Mandlekar et al. [31], Pattanaik et al. [44]
propose different adversarial training algorithms. Based on the idea
that adversarial samples are not effective for the frame prediction
module, Lin et al. [29] use previous images to predict future input
and detect adversarial examples. Havens [21] propose the Meta-
Learned Advantage Hierarchy (MLAH) framework that estimates
advantage to measure the underlying changes in a task, in order to
detect the attack.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we show that in the context of autonomous defence
in cyber networks, RL agents can be manipulated by attacks that
target the training process, even if the attacker only has partial
observability of the environment and defensive algorithms. In or-
der to defend against the attack, we propose an inversion method
that aims to revert the perturbations added by the attacker. Our
experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
approach, and show that it causes limited impact in non-attack
scenarios. Our work focuses on learning in software-defined net-
working, which brings with it novel threat models of independent
interest to adversarial learning research.
For future work, we plan to work on three directions—(1) partial
observability: (i) impose partial observability also on the defender,
since in real networks, the defender may not be able to obtain the
correct states of all the nodes all the time; (ii) identify the minimum
set of nodes the attacker needs to control in order to achieve a
certain level of effectiveness. (2) Consider a more powerful attacker
that can (i) expand their partial observability as the attack proceeds;
and (ii) spread more freely through the network, instead of having
to compromise all the nodes on the paths to the critical server. (3)
Replace the binary state with a continuous state, e.g., consider using
multiple network performance metrics.
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A COMPARISON OF ATTACKING METHODS
Here we provide the details of the other three attacking methods
as mentioned in Section 3. Note that when comparing the four
methods, in order to eliminate other possible factors, we adopt the
white-box, full observability model. In addition, there is no limit
on the choice of false positive or false negative node either.
Attack I : tampering with a small number (e.g., 5%) of rewards
to maximise the defender’s loss. Specifically, gradient informa-
tion is used to select which rewards to tamper with. For exam-
ple, the loss function for a DDQN agent is: Li (θi ) = E [( r +
γQ(s ′, argmaxa′ Q(s ′,a′; θi ); θ−i ) − Q(s,a; θi ))2], where θ and θ−
are the parameters of the two DQNs. As shown in Algorithm 3, in
the ith training iteration, after a batch of experiences (LE ) are sam-
pled for training, the attacker calculates the gradient of ∂Li/∂r j (j =
1, 2, ..., |LE |) for each of them, and flips the sign of experience whose
gradient (1) has the largest absolute value |∂Li/∂r j |, and (2) satisfies
r j · ∂Li/∂r j < 0 (if r j · ∂Li/∂r j > 0, then flipping the sign decreases
the loss function).
Attack II : random perturbation of the observed states. For each
observed experience (s,a, s ′, r ), the attacker chooses the false posi-
tive and false negative nodes uniformly at random.
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Attack III : manipulating the states to minimise the defender’s
rewards (Algorithm 4). For each observed experience (s,a, s ′, r ),
suppose that the attacker knows the optimal action a∗ for state s , if
a = a∗, they loop through all nodes to find the false positive and
false negative nodes that minimise r ; otherwise, they introduce FP
and FN readings to maximise r .
Algorithm 3: Attack I: Tampering with reward
Input :The list of sampled experiences LE ; The loss function
Li of the RL agent
Output :The tampered experiences L′E
1 for experience (sj ,aj , s ′j , r j ) in LE do
2 Calculate д = ∂Li/∂r j ;
3 if |д | > maxG and д · r j < 0 then
4 maxG = |д |;
5 maxIdx = j;
6 (smaxIdx ,amaxIdx , s ′maxIdx , rmaxIdx ) ←(smaxIdx ,amaxIdx , s ′maxIdx ,−rmaxIdx );
7 return L′E
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Figure 5: Comparison of the four attack methods. Threat
model: white-box, full observability, no limit on the choices
of FPs and FNs, one FP and one FN are added per time; net-
work topology: the same as described in [19].
We used the same network topology and experimental setup as
described in [19] to compare the four methods. As can be seen from
the results in Fig. 5: (1) the first two attacks almost have no impact
on the final optimal actions. Specifically, we found that although
Attack I increased the agent’s loss, it only delayed the agent from
learning the optimal actions; (2) Attack II I is less effective than
the method introduced in Sec. 3, even though it requires a more
knowledgeable attacker (the attacker knows the optimal action for
a given state).
B DEFENCE VIA DIMENSION REDUCTION
In addition to the inversion defence mechanism introduced in Sec. 4,
we have also explored the feasibility of applying dimension reduc-
tion as a potential defence method, since it has been used in the
study of adversarial machine learning.
Specifically, (1) during the pre-training stage of a DDQN agent,
the agent randomly takes actions to obtain experiences, and the
deep neural network does not get updated. We use the data gener-
ated in this stage to create a mapping that transforms the original
data into a lower dimension. (2) Once the pre-training stage is fin-
ished, all further inputs will be first transformed using the obtained
mapping, and then fed to the deep neural network to learn the
optimal actions. The key rationale behind this defence method is to
introduce some degree of randomness into the training, and since
the attacker does not know the generated mapping, their adversar-
ial samples in the original input space may not be working in the
transformed space.
In order to create the mapping, we have compared factor anal-
ysis and principal component analysis. In addition, we have also
considered three forms of loss functions: Huber loss, linear-error
and squared-error loss.
Algorithm 4: Attack III: Minimise/maximise rewards
Input :The original experience, (s,a, s ′, r ); The list if all
nodes, N ; the optimal action a∗ for state s
Output :The tampered experience (s,a, s ′ + δ , r ′)
1 r FNmin = 1, r
F P
min = 1, r
FN
max = −1, r F Pmax = −1;
2 for node n in N do
3 if n is compromised then
4 mark n as uncompromised;
5 if a == a∗ then
// Discourage taking the optimal action
6 if r ′ < r FNmin then
7 FN = n;
8 r FNmin = r
′;
9 else
// Encourage taking other actions
10 if r ′ > r FNmax then
11 FN = n;
12 r FNmax = r
′;
13 restore n as compromised;
14 else if n is uncompromised then
15 mark n as compromised;
16 if a == a∗ then
17 if r ′ < r F Pmin then
18 FP = n;
19 r F Pmin = r
′;
20 else
21 if r ′ > r F Pmax then
22 FP = n;
23 r F Pmax = r
′;
24 restore n as uncompromised;
25 Change FN (FP ) to uncompromised (compromised);
26 return (s,a, s ′ + δ , r ′)
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Our statistics suggest that the effectiveness of the defencemethod
depends on whether or not the attacker can poison the mapping:
(1) if the adversary launches only random attacks, i.e., picking
FPs and FNs uniformly at random, during the pre-training stage,
and an appropriate mapping is generated, then the method will be
effective—after the pre-training stage, even if the attacker adopts
the mechanism as introduced in Sec. 3, the attack will not be suc-
cessful most of the time. In this case, factor analysis provides the
best results, but there is not any obvious difference among the
three forms of loss functions. (2) However, if the adversary starts
the calculated attack from the beginning, then the mapping itself
will be poisoned, and the defence method is not effective.
